10 — Security, compliance and operations
Trust model in one table
| Asset | Who may read/act | Control |
|---|---|---|
| Another tenant's data | nobody in a tenant | separate DB/bucket/process; token org checks |
| LiveKit API secret | CP broker only | Infisical path restricted to the broker identity |
| Coolify API token | CP worker only | root-equivalent on host; rotated; network-restricted |
| Zitadel mgmt rights | CP provisioner service account | narrowly scoped IAM role; JWT profile key in Infisical |
| Tenant S3 key | that tenant's go-meet (+ Egress per request) | bucket-scoped policy |
| Recordings | meeting participants as authorized by go-meet | presigned 15 min; SSE |
| Audit log | operators | append-only, ids not content |
Threat model (STRIDE-lite)
| Threat | Scenario | Mitigations |
|---|---|---|
| Spoofing | Forged webhook to a tenant stack | HMAC from router; stack only accepts router signature; internal network only |
| Spoofing | Stolen go-meet session | HttpOnly/Secure/SameSite cookies, back-channel logout, short refresh window |
| Tampering | Tenant tries another tenant's room | Broker prefix check on verified org; names unguessable |
| Repudiation | Operator action disputes | Audit rows in same transaction; Zitadel + Infisical audit trails |
| Information disclosure | Compromised tenant stack | Only its own DB/bucket/secrets; room-scoped tokens (≤1 h); no LiveKit secret |
| Information disclosure | Leaked presigned URL | 15 min TTL, tenant-scoped; recording URLs not posted statically |
| Denial of service | Noisy tenant | Per-tenant CPU/mem caps, per-shard isolation, lobby/request throttling in go-meet, per-tenant rate limits at broker |
| Elevation | SSRF/RCE in control plane | API process lacks powerful creds; workers isolated; egress allow-lists |
| Elevation | Zitadel misconfig (auto-link) | Auto-create/auto-link off by default; domain verification; org-scoped IdP only |
| Supply chain | Image compromise | Pin digests, scan (Coolify can scan images), signed builds for go-meet and CP |
Residual risks to accept explicitly
- Shared LiveKit is a shared failure domain; Enterprise tier gets a dedicated node/key.
- Control plane compromise is high impact → smallest possible surface, separate worker role, MFA for operators, break-glass procedure.
- LiveKit token non-revocation: bounded by TTL (≤ 1 h; recording and admin tokens shorter).
- Host-level disk encryption protects against disk theft, not a root compromise of the host.
GDPR / EU sovereignty mapping
| Requirement | Mechanism |
|---|---|
| Data residency | Single EU region for all planes; region on tenant row; no non-EU sub-processors for content (transcription is EU-hosted or local Whisper) |
| Purpose limitation, minimization | Audit log holds ids only; LiveKit holds no content; transcripts opt-in |
| Right of access / portability | Tenant admin export (recordings, transcripts, Matrix export, meeting data) |
| Right to erasure | Offboarding saga + crypto-erase (05); per-user erasure requests via tenant admin tooling |
| Retention | S3 lifecycle + per-tenant policy; documented defaults (08) |
| Security of processing | Isolation, encryption, short-lived creds, audit, backups with drills |
| Breach notification | Central logging + alerting; runbook with 72 h clock |
| Sub-processors | Documented list: hosting provider, Cloudflare (DNS/CDN), email relay if any |
| DPIA / records | Maintain RoPA per module; recording/transcription DPIA template for tenants |
Compliance statements are design intent, not certification. Legal review and DPAs are out of scope of this document.
Observability
| Signal | Tooling (default) | Labels |
|---|---|---|
| Logs | Loki or ELK, pino JSON | tenant, service, request_id; stdout per container keeps tenant logs separable |
| Metrics | Prometheus + Grafana | tenant, shard, module |
| Traces | OpenTelemetry (CP, go-meet) | propagate traceparent through broker calls |
| Uptime | Synthetic probe per tenant (login, token, Matrix /versions) | — |
| LiveKit | Prometheus endpoint of LiveKit + Egress | node, room prefix aggregated |
Alerts (initial set): provisioning failures, drift detected, shard > 80% capacity, broker 5xx/latency, webhook forward failures, Egress failures, certificate expiry < 14 d, backup job failure, Infisical unreachable.
Operational runbooks (to write)
- Provision/retry/cleanup a tenant.
- Rotate: Zitadel service-account key, Infisical identity, LiveKit key (rolling: add new key, switch broker, remove old), RustFS key, webhook secret.
- Add a Postgres shard; relocate a tenant.
- Restore a tenant from backup; erase a tenant (with certificate).
- LiveKit node failure; broker failure; Zitadel outage behavior.
- Coolify token rotation and host recovery.
- Upgrade rings for go-meet, Tuwunel, Zitadel, LiveKit.
Security checklists
Per release (go-meet / CP): dependency + image scan, migration review, OpenAPI diff, contract tests (go-meet has Django-compat contract tests), secret scanning, SBOM.
Per new tenant: probes pass; MFA enforced for tenant admins; SSO test login before enforcing; retention policy confirmed; export path verified.
Quarterly: access review of Infisical identities and Coolify tokens; restore drill; key rotation; pen-test scope review.