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10 — Security, compliance and operations

Trust model in one table​

AssetWho may read/actControl
Another tenant's datanobody in a tenantseparate DB/bucket/process; token org checks
LiveKit API secretCP broker onlyInfisical path restricted to the broker identity
Coolify API tokenCP worker onlyroot-equivalent on host; rotated; network-restricted
Zitadel mgmt rightsCP provisioner service accountnarrowly scoped IAM role; JWT profile key in Infisical
Tenant S3 keythat tenant's go-meet (+ Egress per request)bucket-scoped policy
Recordingsmeeting participants as authorized by go-meetpresigned 15 min; SSE
Audit logoperatorsappend-only, ids not content

Threat model (STRIDE-lite)​

ThreatScenarioMitigations
SpoofingForged webhook to a tenant stackHMAC from router; stack only accepts router signature; internal network only
SpoofingStolen go-meet sessionHttpOnly/Secure/SameSite cookies, back-channel logout, short refresh window
TamperingTenant tries another tenant's roomBroker prefix check on verified org; names unguessable
RepudiationOperator action disputesAudit rows in same transaction; Zitadel + Infisical audit trails
Information disclosureCompromised tenant stackOnly its own DB/bucket/secrets; room-scoped tokens (≤1 h); no LiveKit secret
Information disclosureLeaked presigned URL15 min TTL, tenant-scoped; recording URLs not posted statically
Denial of serviceNoisy tenantPer-tenant CPU/mem caps, per-shard isolation, lobby/request throttling in go-meet, per-tenant rate limits at broker
ElevationSSRF/RCE in control planeAPI process lacks powerful creds; workers isolated; egress allow-lists
ElevationZitadel misconfig (auto-link)Auto-create/auto-link off by default; domain verification; org-scoped IdP only
Supply chainImage compromisePin digests, scan (Coolify can scan images), signed builds for go-meet and CP

Residual risks to accept explicitly​

  • Shared LiveKit is a shared failure domain; Enterprise tier gets a dedicated node/key.
  • Control plane compromise is high impact → smallest possible surface, separate worker role, MFA for operators, break-glass procedure.
  • LiveKit token non-revocation: bounded by TTL (≤ 1 h; recording and admin tokens shorter).
  • Host-level disk encryption protects against disk theft, not a root compromise of the host.

GDPR / EU sovereignty mapping​

RequirementMechanism
Data residencySingle EU region for all planes; region on tenant row; no non-EU sub-processors for content (transcription is EU-hosted or local Whisper)
Purpose limitation, minimizationAudit log holds ids only; LiveKit holds no content; transcripts opt-in
Right of access / portabilityTenant admin export (recordings, transcripts, Matrix export, meeting data)
Right to erasureOffboarding saga + crypto-erase (05); per-user erasure requests via tenant admin tooling
RetentionS3 lifecycle + per-tenant policy; documented defaults (08)
Security of processingIsolation, encryption, short-lived creds, audit, backups with drills
Breach notificationCentral logging + alerting; runbook with 72 h clock
Sub-processorsDocumented list: hosting provider, Cloudflare (DNS/CDN), email relay if any
DPIA / recordsMaintain RoPA per module; recording/transcription DPIA template for tenants

Compliance statements are design intent, not certification. Legal review and DPAs are out of scope of this document.

Observability​

SignalTooling (default)Labels
LogsLoki or ELK, pino JSONtenant, service, request_id; stdout per container keeps tenant logs separable
MetricsPrometheus + Grafanatenant, shard, module
TracesOpenTelemetry (CP, go-meet)propagate traceparent through broker calls
UptimeSynthetic probe per tenant (login, token, Matrix /versions)—
LiveKitPrometheus endpoint of LiveKit + Egressnode, room prefix aggregated

Alerts (initial set): provisioning failures, drift detected, shard > 80% capacity, broker 5xx/latency, webhook forward failures, Egress failures, certificate expiry < 14 d, backup job failure, Infisical unreachable.

Operational runbooks (to write)​

  1. Provision/retry/cleanup a tenant.
  2. Rotate: Zitadel service-account key, Infisical identity, LiveKit key (rolling: add new key, switch broker, remove old), RustFS key, webhook secret.
  3. Add a Postgres shard; relocate a tenant.
  4. Restore a tenant from backup; erase a tenant (with certificate).
  5. LiveKit node failure; broker failure; Zitadel outage behavior.
  6. Coolify token rotation and host recovery.
  7. Upgrade rings for go-meet, Tuwunel, Zitadel, LiveKit.

Security checklists​

Per release (go-meet / CP): dependency + image scan, migration review, OpenAPI diff, contract tests (go-meet has Django-compat contract tests), secret scanning, SBOM.

Per new tenant: probes pass; MFA enforced for tenant admins; SSO test login before enforcing; retention policy confirmed; export path verified.

Quarterly: access review of Infisical identities and Coolify tokens; restore drill; key rotation; pen-test scope review.